

MAR 2 U 2012 Edwin F. McPherson-State Bar No. 106084 1 Pierre B. Pine -- State Bar No. 211299 JOHN A. CLAHKE_CLERK 2 McPHERSON RANE LLP 1801 Century Park East BY ANDRE WILLIAMS, DEPUTY 24th Floor 3 Los Angeles, CA 90067 CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE Tel:(310)553-8833 4 Fax:(310)553-9233 5 Attorneys for Defendant ESCAPE MEDIA GROUP, INC. 6 Richard A. Sterie SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 7 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 8 9 SS022099 In the Matter of the Subpoena Issued to CASE NO. 10 Digital Music News LLC in: In the Supreme Court of the State of 11 UMG RECORDINGS, INC., New York, New York County 12 Index No. 100152/2010 Plaintiffs. PETITION TO ENFORCE THE (1) 13 SUBPOENA FOR PRODUCTION V. OF BUSINESS RECORDS 14 ESCAPE MEDIA GROUP, INC., ET AL. SERVED BY ESCAPE MEDIA GROUP, INC. ON DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS, LLC 15 Defendants. 16 **DECLARATION OF MATTHEW (2)** H. GIGER 17 18 Defendant Escape Media Group, Inc. ("Escape") submits this memorandum of law in 19 20 support of its Petition to Compel Digital Music News, LLC to comply with the Subpoena for Business Records issued by Escape on February 20, 2012 (the "Subpoena"), and respectfully 21 requests the assigned Court to schedule a hearing date for this Petition at its earliest 22 convenience: 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 27 /// 28

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Escape brings this Petition under California Code of Civil Procedure §2025.480 and §2029.600, seeking an order of this Court compelling Digital Music News, LLC ("DMN") to comply with the Subpoena, which Escape served pursuant to the Interstate and International Depositions and Discovery Act in connection with a lawsuit entitled UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Escape Media Group, Inc., Index No. 100152/2010, pending in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County (the "New York State Action"). The Subpoena requests information relating to a false and defamatory anonymous comment (the "Anonymous Comment") to a blog post by Paul Resnikoff, the self-described "founder" and "publisher" of DMN, in October of 2011. The Anonymous Comment, in which an unidentified individual claiming to be a Grooveshark employee falsely accuses Escape and its executives of encouraging Escape's employees to upload copyrighted sound recordings to Escape's "Grooveshark" music streaming website, is directly relevant to, inter alia, Escape's central defense in the New York State Action that it is entitled to the "safe harbor" from claims of copyright infringement afforded to internet service providers such as Escape under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 ("DMCA"). DMN has refused to comply with the Subpoena, without legitimate basis.

Escape has corresponded directly with DMN regarding its refusal to comply with the Subpoena, through letters exchanged with Mr. Resnikoff. Escape also received a purported Motion to Quash the Subpoena from Mr. Resnikoff, although he apparently failed to file that motion, no record of which exists in the Los Angeles courts. In his correspondence and "motion," Mr. Resnikoff has asserted that he is privileged to refuse compliance with the Subpoena pursuant to Cal. Const. art. I § 2(b) (the "California Shield Law") and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. As discussed below, Digital Music News is not entitled to the referenced legal and constitutional protections in respect of the Anonymous Comment, and possesses no cognizable basis to refuse compliance with the Subpoena.

The California Shield Law protects a journalist's ability to research, draft and publish a news story utilizing anonymously supplied information. It does not apply to "casual" internet posts¹ by visitors to a "news" website, such as the Anonymous Comment. The Shield Law is intended to protect a journalist from forced disclosure of anonymous sources accessed by him or her while compiling a story. Anonymous comments posted subsequent to the publication of an article are, by their very nature, exogenous to the journalistic process, i.e., they are crafted and edited by the users themselves, not by a "journalist" protected by the Shield Law, and are mere ruminations by the website's readers on subjects of their choosing, sometimes wildly off-topic. As such, the Shield Law does not permit DMN's failure to comply with the Subpoena.

DMN's reliance on the First Amendment to avoid disclosure is similarly misplaced. While the First Amendment does afford a limited right to speak anonymously, its protections are qualified, particularly when applied to the sort of purely commercial speech reflected in the Anonymous Comment. The limited First Amendment protection of anonymous speech is balanced in such cases against a party's need for information concerning the identity of the speaker. The First Amendment does not excuse Mr. Resnikoff's compliance with the Subpoena where, as here, the information sought is critical evidence that is highly relevant, *inter alia*, to Escape's defense under the DMCA, and Escape is unable to obtain that evidence elsewhere. Moreover, as the First Amendment may not be used to shield unlawful conduct, its protections do not extend to the false and defamatory Anonymous Comment.

Because access to the information requested in the Subpoena is crucially relevant to Escape's defenses in the State Court Action and is not privileged from disclosure, Escape respectfully requests that this Court enter an Order requiring DMN's immediate compliance with the Subpoena, *inter alia*, by producing all information in its possession concerning the identity of the author of the Anonymous Comment.

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See O'Grady v. Superior Court, (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Grooveshark and the DMCA

Escape developed, owns and operates the Internet service "Grooveshark," which is accessible on the World Wide Web at www.grooveshark.com ("Grooveshark"). Through Escape's Grooveshark service, third-party internet users may upload files containing audio recordings to the Grooveshark site, including (as is true with the widely used YouTube website) the users' self-produced recordings of their own works. The resulting archive of sound recordings - - consisting of recordings added by thousands of Grooveshark users - - is searchable through the Grooveshark website, thus allowing users to locate particular recordings on the site and "stream" them over the Internet, *i.e.*, play them (without making copies) through their individual computers.

Grooveshark represents a new form of music distribution at the forefront of digital innovation. Escape has obtained licenses or other contractual authorization for its Grooveshark service from a number of major entities in the record business and many other copyright owners, and Escape also operates within the bounds of the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512. The DMCA provides a "safe harbor" under which an internet service provider ("ISP"), assuming compliance with certain conditions and procedures set forth in the statute, is protected against liability for copyright infringement, *inter alia*, for the "storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider." <u>Id.</u> § 512(c).

Thus, the DMCA safe harbor protections apply to ISPs, like Escape (or YouTube), "who furnish[] a platform on which its users post and access all sorts of materials as they wish, while the provider is unaware of its content, but identifies an agent to receive complaints of infringement, and removes identified material when he learns it infringes." Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 07 Civ. 2102 (LLS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62829, at *37. Consistent with DMCA procedures, Escape, *inter alia*, requires that any users who wish to upload recordings to Grooveshark confirm that they are the owners or authorized licensees of the copyrights in those recordings; scrupulously complies with "takedown" requests submitted by

copyright owners; and denies uploading privileges to all identified infringers.

The New York State Action

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UMG, one of the world's largest owners and exclusive licensees of musical recordings, commenced the State Court Action against Escape in 2010. In the New York State Action, UMG alleges two New York common law causes of action, for copyright infringement and unfair competition, focused exclusively on sound recordings available through the Grooveshark service that were created prior to February 15, 1972. (Giger Decl., Ex. "G.") UMG's restriction of its claims in the State Court Action to infringement of pre-1972 recordings, which receive unique treatment under the Copyright Act, reflects an attempt to avoid Escape's asserted DMCA "safe harbor" defense, which UMG has moved to dismiss. (Giger Decl. ¶¶ 14 - 17 & Ex. "H.") While the Court has not yet issued a decision on UMG's motion, a recent decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mp3tunes, LLC, (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 07 Civ. 9931 (WHP), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93351, undermines UMG's motion and directly supports Escape's assertion of its DMCA defense in the New York State Action. In that regard, the Capitol Records Court specifically held - - consistent with Escape's own arguments in opposition to UMG's motion - - that "[t]he plain meaning of the DMCA's safe harbors, read in light of their purpose, covers both state and federal copyright claims," i.e., the DMCA is applicable to state common-law claims for alleged infringement of pre-1972 sound recordings. Id. at *27.

Escape thus relies in the New York State Action on its DMCA defense, a core defense in that action, which provides a "safe harbor" for compliant internet service providers who allow copyrighted materials to be added to their computer systems by internet users. (Giger Decl., Ex. "H.") Escape's DMCA defense may well not apply, however, to the sort of conduct falsely alleged in the Anonymous Comment - - i.e., the alleged encouragement and support of direct uploading of copyrighted materials, without a license, by Escape's own employees.²

In November of 2011, UMG (later joined by certain other record labels) filed a second lawsuit against Escape in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New

The Subpoena

In light of the foregoing, the Anonymous Comment is directly relevant to Escape's DMCA defense in the State Court Action and will undoubtedly be relied upon by UMG in furtherance of its efforts to defeat that defense. Accordingly, on or about January 9, 2012, Escape issued the narrowly tailored Subpoena to DMN, seeking two principal categories of information that are needed to assist Escape in defending against UMG's claims and exposing the baseless (and possibly fraudulent or collusive) nature of the Anonymous Comment. (See Giger Decl., Ex. "A.")

Specifically, in the Subpoena, Escape seeks documents concerning the identity of the author of the Anonymous Comment. (<u>Id.</u> at 5.) In addition, in furtherance of Escape's efforts to discover the provenance of the Anonymous Comment and UMG's own efforts (if any) to determine its veracity, the Subpoena also seeks any recent correspondence between DMN and UMG concerning Escape, Grooveshark or the Article, as well as any documents concerning the same. (<u>Id.</u>)

III. ARGUMENT

As set forth above, the information sought in the Subpoena concerning the Anonymous Comment is highly relevant, *inter alia*, to Escape's DMCA defense in the State Court Action. DMN and Mr. Resnikoff, however, have refused to comply with the Subpoena. Mr. Resnikoff has asserted in correspondence with counsel for Escape (and in his unfiled Motion to Quash) that he is protected from releasing the identity of the anonymous commenter by both the California Shield Law and a purported privilege under the First Amendment to decline to reveal the identity of anonymous speakers. These supposed privileges and protections are inapplicable to the

York, asserting claims for federal copyright infringement (the "Federal Court Action"). UMG's claims in the Federal Court Action adopt the defamatory substance of the Anonymous Comment and repackage it as allegations that Escape directed its employees to upload thousands of UMG's unlicensed sound recordings to the Grooveshark system. (Giger Decl., Ex. "I.") The sole basis set forth in UMG's Complaint for this allegation is the Anonymous Comment. (Id.)

defamatory Anonymous Comment posted on DMN's website, and there is no legitimate basis for DMN and Mr. Resnikoff to refuse to comply with the Subpoena.

A. CALIFORNIA'S JOURNALIST SHIELD LAW IS INAPPLICABLE.

Several states, including California, have enacted "Shield Laws" protecting journalists from having to disclose sources or information used by them in compiling news for publication. California's Shield Law provides, in relevant part, that a person "connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication...cannot be adjudged in contempt...for refusing to disclose...the source of any information procured while so connected or employed for publication in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical publication, or for refusing to disclose an unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering receiving or processing of information for communication to the public." *Cal. Evid. Code* § 1070(a); see also *Cal. Const.* Art. I § 2(b).

In his unfiled motion, Mr. Resnikoff asserts that, as a "blogger," he is a journalist and is thus protected by the California Shield Law. But this assertion begs, rather than resolves, the question. Escape does not argue that the Shield Law may not apply under proper circumstances to industry focused internet blogs such as DMN; nor does Escape challenge that, in appropriate circumstances, the Shield Law may protect an anonymous source upon which a journalist relies while procuring information for his or her story. Those issues are not implicated here, where an anonymous comment was posted on an online message board subsequent to an article's publication, as such *post-facto* commentary is not the type of journalistic activity that California's Shield Law protects.

It is undisputed that DMN did not use or even obtain the Anonymous Comment in procuring information for Mr. Resnikoff's blog entry. Rather, Mr. Resnikoff published an article on DMN about Grooveshark (and the musical group King Crimson), and upon publication of his story, supplied a message board available for any type of comments, on any subject, that DMN's readers might choose to post. The author of the Anonymous Comment used this message board to disseminate his or her own post-publication comments to Mr. Resnikoff's blog

entry. Simply stated, California's Shield Law does confer a journalistic privilege upon such comments by readers of a story that were not a part of the journalistic process through which the story itself was researched and written.

In his correspondence and his unfiled motion, Mr. Resnikoff repeatedly cites to O'Grady v. Superior Court, (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) 44 Cal. Rptr.3d 72, as primary support for his contention that the Anonymous Comment is protected by California's Shield Law. The O'Grady case actually undermines DMN's purported reliance on the Shield Law. Alhough the O'Grady court held that bloggers may be considered "journalists" under the Shield Law, the court was careful to distinguish between a journalist's posting of an online article based on anonymous information, and (as was true in the present case) an anonymous commenter posting his or her own comment that appears "more or less immediately" after the publication of an article. Id. at 91. Such comments, the court in O'Grady offered, do not reflect the "kind and degree of editorial control that makes them resemble a newspaper or magazine." Id. Here, because the anonymous commenter wrote and posted the defamatory statements, without the participation of the DMN staff - - i.e., DMN did not exercise "editorial control" over them - - those comments are not entitled to protection under California's Shield Law.

The O'Grady court also noted that it was the newspaper staff in that case, "and no one else, who 'posted' the content," which rendered the content subject to California's Shield Law protection. <u>Id.</u> at 92.

Legal commentary on the issue (on which Mr. Resnikoff also mistakenly relies) similarly confirms that the Shield Law is inapplicable in this case. For example, Blogging and Journalism: Extending Shield Law Protection to New Media Forms confirms that the O'Grady case "suggested that those individuals who are 'casual visitors' to newsgroups, chat rooms, or discussion groups would likely not be protected, as this most likely would not be considered news." Sharon Doctor, Blogging and Journalism: Extending Shield Law Protection to New Media Forms, 54(4) Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media at 599 (2010). In the instant case, the unidentified individual who posted the defamatory Anonymous Comment, claiming (Escape believes falsely) to be an employee of Grooveshark while hiding behind anonymity, can hardly be said to be anything more than a "casual visitor."

Courts in other jurisdictions similarly have recognized that after-the-fact commenting on online news articles is not the type of journalistic activity that state shield laws were intended to protect. In 2011, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that, "online message boards" are not sufficiently similar to the news entities listed in the state's Shield Law to fall within the protections of that law. Too Much Media, Inc. v. Hale, (N.J. 2011) 20 A.3d 364. Instructively, in reaching that decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court, citing O'Grady, noted that California's Shield Law was less expansive than its New Jersey statutory counterpart, and that the O'Grady court had "pointedly contrasted" news oriented websites with entities akin to message boards. Id. at 379-380. In addition, the Indiana Court of Appeals recently rejected the claim that anonymous posters were "confidential sources" within the meaning of the state's journalist shield provision. Miller v. Junior Achievement, (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2012) 2012 Ind. App. LEXIS 64 at *35("we hold that to be considered 'the source of any information', one must provide information that is then interpreted by the news organization.") (emphasis added).

As the O'Grady Court observed, and as Courts outside of this jurisdiction have confirmed, journalist shield laws simply do not afford protection to anonymous commentators who offer their post-facto views on articles that have already been published. The rationale for this rule is both manifest and self-evident, i.e., journalist shield laws are designed to protect sources who are relied upon by journalists in researching and writing their stories, not individuals who elect to anonymously inject themselves into a debate after an article has been published. The "author" of the Anonymous Comment falls squarely in the latter category, i.e., he or she is not a source in any sense of a news article, and, as such, the California Shield Law provides no basis for DMN to resist compliance with the Subpoena. Accordingly, this Court should direct DMN to comply with the Subpoena in its entirety.

B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO ANONYMOUS SPEECH DOES NOT JUSTIFY DMN'S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE SUBPOENA.

Based on Mr. Resnikoff's prior correspondence and DMN's unfiled motion to quash, Escape anticipates that DMN will also assert a supposed First Amendment privilege to justify its 1 n
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non-compliance with the Subpoena. As will be further explicated below, particularly in light of the central relevance of the matters addressed in the Anonymous Comment to Escape's defenses in the New York State Action, the limited First Amendment protections afforded to commercial speech plainly do not permit DMN to avoid compliance with the Subpoena.

The widespread availability of internet forums (such as DMN's blog comment board) has given rise to "the ability to commit certain tortious acts, such as defamation . . . entirely online" while acting "pseudonymously or anonymously" or giving "fictitious or incomplete identifying information." Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, (N.D. Cal. 1999) 185 F.R.D. 573, 578. In light of this reality, courts have recognized that "[t]hose who suffer damages as a result of tortious or other actionable communications on the Internet should be able to seek appropriate redress by preventing the wrongdoers from hiding behind an illusory shield of purported First Amendment rights." In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., (Va. Cir. 2000) 52 Va. Cir. 26, 35. To rule otherwise would leave such parties "virtually defenseless to this potentially virulent hazard." Id. at 36.

In light of these serious concerns, the First Amendment "right to participate in online forums anonymously or pseudonymously" must be balanced against "the need to provide injured parties with an forum [sic] in which they may seek address for grievances." Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 578; see also In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. at 34-35 ("The protection of the right to communicate anonymously must be balanced against the need to assure that those persons who choose to abuse the opportunities presented by this medium can be made to answer for such transgressions."). In this way, the First Amendment privilege to speak anonymously on the Internet "is not unlimited . . . and the degree of scrutiny varies depending on the circumstances and the type of speech at issue." In re Anonymous Online Speakers, (9th Cir. 2011) 661 F.3d 1168, 1173.

It is well established that commercial speech, such as that at issue here, enjoys "less First Amendment Protection" than non-commercial speech, such as literary, religious or political speech. Lefkoe v. The Doe Client, (4th Cir. 2009) 577 F.3d 240, 248 (noting that commercial speech "is subject to modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of non-

commercial speech."); see also In re Anonymous Online Speakers, (9th Cir. 2011) 661 F.3d 1168, 1173(noting that commercial speech enjoys "a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of *First Amendment* values"). Indeed, the limited First Amendment protections afforded to commercial speech only apply when "the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity." In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1173; Beauharnais v. Illinois, (1992) 343 U.S. 250, 266, 72 S. Ct. 725, 735 (defamatory statements are not entitled to First Amendment protection).

Victims of anonymous online defamatory comments may overcome the limited First Amendment protection for commercial speech by "demonstrat[ing] a sufficient need for the discovery to counterbalance that infringement." In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1174 (affirming a district court order to disclose the identity of three anonymous online bloggers accused of "orchestrat[ing] an Internet smear campaign via anonymous postings and videos disparaging [company] and its business practices"). Stated another way, in the context of commercial speech, the "claimed First Amendment right to anonymity is subject to a substantial governmental interest in disclosure so long as disclosure advances the interest and goes no further than reasonably necessary." Lefkoe, 577 F.3d at 249. Where (as here) the identification of an anonymous commenter "could be relevant and useful" to the defendant, the requisite "substantial government interest in providing [the defendant] a fair opportunity to defend itself in court is served by requiring the [anonymous commenter] to reveal its identity and provide the relevant information." Id.

Consistent with the foregoing, courts that have weighed the right to speak anonymously against the need for third-party discovery to support claims or defenses in a pending action, have applied a four-part balancing test: "(1) the subpoena seeking the information was issued in good faith and not for any improper purpose, (2) the information sought relates to a core claim or defense, (3) the identifying information is directly and materially relevant to that claim or defense, and (4) information sufficient to establish or to disprove that claim or defense is unavailable from any other source." <u>Doe v. 2TheMart.com</u>, (W.D. Wash. 2001) 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095; <u>Breslin v. Dickinson Township</u>, (M.D. Pa. May 19, 2011) 09-CV-1396, 2011

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U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54389, at *5. Application of these factors to the present case, cognizant of the limited protection afforded the commercial speech at issue, mandates the disclosure of the requested information possessed by DMN concerning the anonymous commenter.

First, the Subpoena was clearly "issued in good faith and not for any improper purpose." The Subpoena is narrowly tailored to uncover the identity of the anonymous commenter, his or her motives in publishing the defamatory Anonymous Comment and the purported basis for his or her knowledge of the allegations set forth therein. Such information is critical in order to prove those allegations false and advance Grooveshark's defenses in the New York State Action.

Second, the requested information plainly relates to a "core defense" of Escape in the New York State Action. The Anonymous Comment alleges that Grooveshark directed infringing uploading of copyrighted songs by its own employees, as opposed to third-party users of the Grooveshark service. Because Escape's DMCA defense is predicated upon content added by third-parties, and might well not apply to alleged infringement actively encouraged by the company, the allegations made by the Anonymous Comment, if true, would significantly impair Escape's ability to defend in the New York State Action. The information sought by the Subpoena thus relates directly to Escape's "core" DMCA defense, *i.e.*, Escape's assertion relates to "safe harbor" protection under the DMCA.

Third, the information requested by the Subpoena is thus not only relevant to Escape's defenses in the New York State Action, but it is essential to Escape's ability to prove that the Anonymous Comment is false and defamatory. Escape denies the serious allegations made in the Anonymous Comment and suspects that the author of that Comment (who avers that he or she is a former Escape employee) is a third-party motivated by ulterior motives, perhaps associated with, or otherwise providing assistance to, the record labels that have commenced lawsuits against Escape. But unless Escape is able to ascertain the identity of the author of the Anonymous Comment, it will be unable to disprove the allegation that he or she is an Escape employee and the concomitant inference that he or she has some basis for the defamatory statements contained in the Anonymous Comment.

Fourth, there is no practicable means by which Escape may learn the identity of the anonymous commenter except through the Subpoena. The anonymous commenter has already refused to reveal his or her identity in the Anonymous Comment itself, in response to a request for such a revelation posted on the DMN comment message board. (Giger Decl., Ex. "B" at 17.) Escape presently has absolutely no knowledge of the source of the comment: no user name, real name, email address, ISP or any other fragment of information with which to even begin searching for the identity of the anonymous commenter. Under the circumstances, the only way for Escape to even commence its search for the anonymous commenter is for DMN to respond to the Subpoena by providing any and all information within its possession associated with that individual.

In light of the limited First Amendment protections afforded to commercial speech such as the Anonymous Comment; the critical relevance of information concerning the author of the Anonymous Comment to Escape's defenses in the New York State Action; and the inability of Escape to identify that individual by other means, this Court should find that the First Amendment does not provide a basis for DMN's refusal to comply with the Subpoena.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Escape's Petition to Enforce the Subpoena should be granted, and DMN should be ordered to immediately comply with the Subpoena by producing all documents requested therein.

DATED: March 20, 2012

McPHERSON RANE LLP Edwin F. McPherson Pierre B. Pine

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Attorneys for Defendant

ESCAPE MEDIA GROUP, INC.

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DECLARATION OF MATTHEW H. GIGER

I, MATTHEW H. GIGER declares as follows:

I am a partner in the law firm of Rosenberg & Giger P.C., counsel for defendant Escape Media Group, Inc. ("Escape") in the referenced action pending in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York (the "New York State Action"). I respectfully offer this Declaration pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2016.040, in support of Escape's Petition to Enforce the Subpoena issued in the New York State Action to Digital Music News LLC ("DMN"). The facts recited in this Declaration are based on my personal knowledge of and involvement in the matters described.

The Subpoena

- 2. On or about January 9, 2012, Escape served DMN with a Subpoena for Production of Business Records In Action Pending Outside California (the "Subpoena"), issued, in accordance with Cal Code Civ. Proc. § 2029.350, by a California licensed attorney who is an associate of Escape's California counsel, McPherson Rane LLP. A copy of the Subpoena is attached to this Declaration as Exhibit "A."
- 3. The Subpoena seeks two categories of information concerning an anonymous comment to an internet blog post on DMN's website (found on the World Wide Web at www.digitalmusicnews.com), which contains assertions that Escape avers are false and defamatory and that are directly applicable, *inter alia*, to Escape's defenses in the New York State Action (the "Anonymous Comment"). A copy of the subject blog posting, together with all comments (including the Anonymous Comment at pages 16 and 17), is attached to this Declaration as Exhibit "B."
- 4. Specifically, Escape seeks, in the Subpoena: (1) documents concerning communications between DMN and the plaintiff in the New York State Action, UMG Recordings, Inc. ("UMG"), concerning Escape's Grooveshark website or the post that includes the Anonymous Comment; and (2) information possessed by DMN concerning the identity of the author of the Anonymous Comment.

- 5. On January 20, 2012, Escape received an undated letter from DMN, in which Paul Resnikoff, the self-described founder and publisher of DMN, acknowledged receipt of the Subpoena by DMN and objected to it on a variety of grounds, including, principally, DMN's misplaced contention that the Subpoena represents an "inappropriate encroachment on [DMN's] journalistic rights." On that basis, DMN requested that Escape "withdraw" its Subpoena. In addition to sending its January 20 letter to Escape, on that same day, DMN posted the letter to its internet blog. A copy of DMN's January 20, 2012 letter to Escape is attached to this Declaration as Exhibit "C."
- 6. Before Escape had the opportunity to respond to DMN's letter objecting to the Subpoena, on or about January 30, 2012, DMN delivered to Escape's California counsel a purported "motion" in which DMN averred that, "on March 27, 2012, at 8:30 a.m. ... before the California Superior Court, Los Angeles County, West District, Santa Monica Courthouse ... [DMN] will seek an Order Quashing or Providing Protection from the Subpoena" (the "Purported Motion to Quash"). In the Purported Motion to Quash, DMN reiterated and expanded upon its arguments concerning its supposed "journalistic rights," including under the California "Shield Law" and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. A copy of the Purported Motion to Quash is attached to this Declaration as Exhibit "D."
- 7. On January 30, 2012, the same day that my office received a copy of the Purported Motion to Quash, Escape responded to DMN's January 20 letter objecting to the Subpoena. In its letter to DMN, Escape, *inter alia*, declined to withdraw the Subpoena; explained that DMN's asserted positions are directly contrary to governing law (including the very legal authority relied upon by DMN in its January 20 letter); and urged DMN to reconsider its refusal to comply with the Subpoena. A copy of Escape's January 30, 2012 letter to DMN is attached to this Declaration as Exhibit "E."
- 8. DMN never responded to Escape's January 30 letter, and the February 20, 2012 response deadline set forth in the Subpoena passed without any indication from DMN as to whether it intended to comply with the Subpoena.

- 9. On or about March 9, 2012, while in the process of preparing its papers in opposition to DMN's Purported Motion to Quash (which Escape assumed had been filed, and to which Escape thus assumed it must respond), Escape contacted this Court and learned for the first time that DMN had never filed the Purported Motion to Quash with the Court, and that, consequently, no hearing had been scheduled for March 27, 2012, or any other date.
- 10. Accordingly, on March 12, 2012, Escape sent another letter to DMN, reiterating its entreaty that DMN reconsider its refusal to comply with the Subpoena and explaining again that DMN's objections to the Subpoena set forth in its January 20 letter and Purported Motion to Quash were not well founded. A copy of Escape's March 12, 2012 letter to DMN is attached to this Declaration as Exhibit "F."
- 11. I also attempted unsuccessfully to contact DMN by telephone on multiple occasions, including by leaving a voicemail message for Mr. Resnikoff on March 14, 2012 in which I requested that he contact me to discuss a resolution of the apparent impasse between DMN and Escape.
- 12. To date, DMN has not responded to *any* of Escape's repeated efforts to resolve its dispute with DMN subsequent to DMN's delivery of its January 20 objection letter and the unfiled Purported Motion to Quash.

The New York State Action

- 13. UMG, one of the world's largest owners and exclusive licensees of musical recordings, commenced the New York State Action against Escape in early 2010, alleging two New York common law causes of action, for copyright infringement and unfair competition, focused exclusively on sound recordings available through Escape's Grooveshark service (found on the World Wide Web at www.grooveshark.com) ("Grooveshark") that were created prior to February 15, 1972. A copy of UMG's Complaint in the New York State Action is attached to this Declaration as Exhibit "G."
- 14. In its Answer to UMG's Complaint, Escape has asserted, *inter alia*, a defense arising under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (the "DMCA"). A copy of Escape's Amended Answer and Counterclaims in the New York State Action is attached to this

- 15. The DMCA provides a "safe harbor" under which an internet service provider such as Escape, assuming compliance with certain conditions and procedures set forth in the statute, is protected against liability for copyright infringement, *inter alia*, for the "storage at the direction of a user [i.e., not Escape] of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider." 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
- 16. Contending that the DMCA does not apply to pre-1972 sound recordings, UMG has moved to dismiss Escape's asserted DMCA defense, which is central to Escape's defense of the New York State Action. The Court has not yet issued a decision on UMG's motion.
- 17. Although UMG's motion to dismiss remains *sub judice*, a recent decision in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, <u>Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mp3tunes, LLC</u>, 07 Civ. 9931 (WHP), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93351 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), held -- consistent with Escape's own arguments in opposition to UMG's motion -- that "[t]he plain meaning of the DMCA's safe harbors, read in light of their purpose, covers both state and federal copyright claims," *i.e.*, the DMCA is applicable to state common-law claims for alleged infringement of pre-1972 sound recordings. <u>Id.</u> at *27.

The New York Federal Action

- 18. In November of 2011, UMG filed a second lawsuit against Escape, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, for federal copyright infringement (the "New York Federal Action"). In that action, UMG principally alleges that Escape, without license or other authority, directed its employees to upload thousands of UMG's sound recordings to the Grooveshark system. In an Amended Complaint, filed on or about December 15, 2011, additional record labels joined UMG as plaintiffs in the New York Federal Action. A copy of the Amended Complaint in the New York Federal Action (without exhibits) is attached to this Declaration as Exhibit "I."
- 19. Plaintiffs' allegations in the New York Federal Action that Escape directed and encouraged its employees to upload plaintiffs' recordings are based on the Anonymous Comment, which purports to have been authored by an individual claiming to "work for

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Grooveshark" and falsely asserts, inter alia, that Escape employees are "assigned ε
predetermined amount of weekly uploads to the [Grooveshark] system and get a small extra
bonus if [they] manage to go above that."

- 20. The accusations against Escape in the Anonymous Comment (if true. which Escape denies) may undermine the applicability of Escape's core DMCA defense in the New York State Action.
- 21. No prior application has been made for the relief sought in Escape's present Petition to Enforce the Subpoena.

I declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the State of New York, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 20th day of March, 2012, in New York, New York.

MÁTTHEW H. GIGER