Winner of the 1993 Price Waterhouse Leadership Award for Lifetime Achievement,
Computerworld Smithsonian Awards
Location: Microsoft Corporation, Bellevue, Washington
Interviewer: David Allison (DA)
Division of Computers, Information, & Society
National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution
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DA: Let's talk about one of your principle applications that came fairly early on that was the development of a word processor, Microsoft Word. What characterized Microsoft Word?
BG: Microsoft Word, although it was the second application that we came out with after Multiplan, was really a milestone because with this one we decided we'd really do something forward, very forward looking. We'd hired Charles Simonyi from Xerox PARC. We knew that graphics interface was where it's at. We knew that laser printers were going to be very big.
So we designed something whose underlying structure was ready for the graphical world. In fact, we made it so that it could show italic and bold, it could work with the mouse, and it was laying things out internally to immense precision. So, even though the screen didn't have that precision, it would print with very high quality. We were making it ready for the laser printers that were going to come. The user interface here was identical to the Multiplan user interface.
There was a family of products that we called the Multi-Tool Family of products. There was Multi-File and Multi-Chart. Those were Microsoft's character-mode applications. We saw that selling these applications would actually be as big a business for us as doing the operating system itself. Our color at the time was green. So this is the documentation we came out with for Word. And although Word was very much praised for its technical richness and anybody who got to use features that had these so called "style sheets" and the ability to use this mouse pointing device wasn't necessarily as easy to use because of the manual and other products that were out there.
So, although MicroPro with WordStar really started to fall apart, the vacuum was filled by a number of products, Word to some degree, Aston-Tate had their MultiMate product that they had bought. There were a number of products, but WordPerfect over time really took the role that WordStar had had. So, 1-2-3 and WordPerfect became strong products, partly with the introduction of the PC. 1-2-3 came along a little more than a year after the PC had shipped, in January 1983. And that really helped to push things along. Because this machine was from IBM that helped.
But people who think historically think, well, IBM was preordained to dominate the market. There is just no way that's true.
IBM succeeded because they had a good team. They were the first to be serious about a 16-bit machine. They worked with us. They worked with Intel, with Sears, and Computerland. And, perhaps most importantly, this machine became the model. This was the machine that people decided to clone in order to build this base of total compatibility. And because people had done that to IBM mainframes it was perhaps most natural to go and do it with this particular machine. And so by making the bus and the software and everything in here licensable by other people, they setup a thing that the whole industry could rally around as the next generation of 16-bit computing.
DA: Now Microsoft is primarily a software company, but you actually got into some important hardware development with the mouse. Do you want to say a few words about that?
BG: Microsoft was playing a much broader role [laughs] than just doing software for this machine. I mean whether it is the keyboard, the character set, the graphics adapter, or even the memory layouts. I laid out memory so the bottom 640K was general purpose RAM and the upper 384 I reserved for video and ROM, and things like that. That is why they talk about the 640K limit. It is actually a limit, not of the software, in any way, shape, or form, it is the limit of the microprocessor. That thing generates addresses, 20-bits addresses, that only can address a megabyte of memory. And, therefore, all the applications are tied to that limit. It was ten times what we had before. But to my surprise, we ran out of that address base for applications within -- oh five or six years people were complaining.
Another thing that Microsoft did, in terms of getting these new machines out there and really showing off what new uses they could be put to, was we came out with our own mouse product. The mouse was invented by Doug Englebart back at Stanford Research Institute. Xerox used it in the Alto, the research machine that PARC built, has a three-button device. The Star had a two-button mouse. And then Apple went and did a mouse, they did a single-button. We believed the two-button concept was the right approach.
So, we went to a Japanese company, Alps, got them to do some design work, paid the patent fees to SRI and Xerox for this, and came out with this as a low-cost add-on. So, even on a character-mode display, being able to move the cursor around in a natural way, we thought was a big advantage. We tied it to Word so that we had a bundle with Word and the Mouse. But then people who didn't like the Mouse thought they shouldn't buy Word. So, it was a little bit of a problem.
When we first brought this out we ordered 50,000 and it took over a year to sell the first 50,000. Today we sell many, many hundreds of thousands in a month. But, at first it looked like maybe we had made a mistake. This did go on to be a very profitable thing for us and we continued to evolve the design going to a sleeker and sleeker appearance over time.
DA: Bill, a number of other people quickly got into the business of making IBM-compatible computers. How did that effect Microsoft?
BG: This phenomena that took place right after the PC came out -- people built compatible machines -- was very important. It meant that the software industry instead of redeveloping for every machine, every keyboard layout, every screen resolution, or any new documentation, that you could come out with one disk and it would work in the machines of multiple manufacturers. So, it created the conditions for an explosion in the software business.
It took time.
The early people to build compatible machines, except for Compaq, actually aren't with us today. Companies like Columbia or... -- I don't even remember the names. There were a lot of them that came and went quite rapidly. Even companies that we think of today like AST, was an add-in board maker back in the early days. And only later got into systems. Radio Shack continued to make their own design systems for quite awhile, but then eventually built compatible systems. But that phenomena was fantastic because it meant the competition to make the fastest machine, the cheapest machine, the most portable machine.
People were moving in so many dimensions all at once.
Compaq distinguished themselves with this portable machine. By today's standards, of course, that's a joke. I mean if somebody lugged this onto an airplane you'd have to laugh at them -- "What the heck is it?". But is was a significant advance. Because they sometimes say that the handle was their most innovative feature.
So, the PC industry really heated up. The volumes took off. The prices started to come down. These early machines were $3,000 - $4,000 dollar machines, and that's without a hard disk, without so much of the capabilities that we expect in a PC today.
Relationship Between Microsoft and Apple
DA: How was your relationship with Apple different from what it had been with IBM and other makers of compatibles?
BG: The relationship between Microsoft and Apple can be divided into a couple of phases.
In the early days when I did software for the Apple II, they were quite small and I worked with their Development Group. We wrote a lot of applications that ran on the Apple II. The SoftCard helped the Apple II a great deal. Decathlon Software. Multiplan software. It was a good relationship. But mostly, we were selling to their customers.
The really unique thing we got into was when Steve Jobs came up and talked about what he was doing with the Macintosh. He solicited us to write a family of applications for that machine. And because of our background in looking at what Xerox had done with graphics interface, we were very excited about this design.
That was different than the Lisa Group. The Lisa Group had done their own applications. And they'd gotten very big, and were bundled in with the machine. So there was no opportunity there. And the Lisa didn't do very well.
But, what Steve was doing with the Macintosh, price wise in keeping things fairly lean, looked like a great approach.
So, instead of really attacking 1-2-3 just at the DOS level, we decided we would focus on the graphical version and do the work on Macintosh and Windows and sort of be a generation ahead if we were right about graphical interface. So Microsoft worked very closely with the early Macintosh team. We were their testing group. They had no testers. We helped shape the features of the machine.
Initially, they had wanted to use the floppy disk of the Apple II, 143K disk. That didn't look too good. Then they wanted to use a 5-1/4" floppy where there were heads on both sides, so called "Twiggy Drive." And that didn't work too well. Finally, at the last minute they, switched to this 3-1/2" drive. And that was a fairly innovative thing. HP had been doing that a little earlier, but this was a milestone. The project kept slipping.
When Steve first came to us it was supposed to ship in early '82 at $995 dollars. Well, it ended up shipping in January of 1984 at $2,495 dollars.
Partly Scully had come in and convinced Steve that the demand would be high and that they had to fund a lot of things. So the price edged up a little bit. Also, Steve tried to convince everybody that this could be a 64K machine. And his engineers were saying, "No way, that's too tight." And we said, "No, we can't do any applications." He went up to 128K.
The model we are looking at here called the "Plus" actually came out about a year after the Macintosh shipped. And they brought it from 128K up to 512K. That was because the... only Microsoft and Apple succeeded to get applications in the 128K machine. It was very, very difficult. The day the machine shipped we had our BASIC, our Multiplan, and they had Write and Paint. Those were really only the important applications for the machine for quite some time.
A year later they beefed up to 512K and got the laser printer, that's when we started coming out with Word, File, Chart, and then later with the Excel product in 1985, which was a very important milestone for this machine. It meant that it wasn't just for wimps, or sometimes they said "for the rest of us", but it was for anybody who wanted the most powerful machine that had graphics interface.
The Mac, although today, is so clearly a grand success, but had a tough time in the early days. The first year it sold to enthusiasts. The second year it actually sold a little bit less. Steve Jobs left Apple under controversial circumstances. It really took until 1985 or so, with things like Excel, before it became solidly entrenched.
The Macintosh was a very, very important milestone. Not only because it established Apple as a key player in helping to find new ideas in the personal computer, but also because it ushered in graphical interface.
It is hard to reconstruct, but people didn't believe in graphical interface. And Apple bet their company on it, and that is why we got so involved in building applications for the Macintosh early on. We thought they were right. And we really bet our success on it as well. And today, all of the machines work that way because it is so much more natural. But this was pushing the limit. And it is the first time the vision of PARC had gotten into a commercial product and got going in a very positive way.
Interestingly, Windows was being developed in parallel with the Macintosh. We actually announced Windows a few months before the Macintosh shipped. We announced in 1983 with a lot of other manufacturers, although, it took some time before we actually shipped Windows, that we were exposing it and evangelizing it to everybody very early on.
The Macintosh, because it was designed around graphical interface had an advantage. And so it would take as much as five or six years before the PC platform had graphics as a standard feature. It wasn't until 1990, with some developments that came later, that graphics really worked. And so this machine got out in front and had a huge impact.
DA: Bill, what led to your decision to build your own site, your own corporate campus?
BG: Well, I was always thinking the environment that we did product development in should be a fun environment, a lot like a college campus. And this idea of using small teams means you want to give them all the tools, all the computers, an individual office, whatever it takes so that they feel like they can concentrate on their jobs and be very creative. And, in the Northwest, having a lot of trees around, you know, one, two, and three story buildings where offices are very good sized. That made sense to me. And we had been looking ever since we moved up to Seattle for a piece of land that wasn't too far away and yet that would let us grow as a company.
And in 1986 we actually got to move into our corporate campus. This kind of shows you one of the buildings here. Initially, there were four buildings like this clustered around the lake you see here, and each of the main Development groups each got their own building. And that meant that we really had the best of all worlds. People felt that it was a fun environment, but yet we were really close to each other as far as working together. Things like people juggling or riding unicycles around, having barbecues outside, having company meetings where everybody would stand around.
This was the original ground breaking. And these are two of the developers, but here we see Jon Shirley who started with the company in 1983. He came from Radio Shack and played a very critical role, because, although I had Steve Ballmer helping me think through business issues and a lot of other people like Kazuhiko Nishi on the product side, or Paul Allen, it was Jon who helped us really grow; what kind of systems did we have to have in place. And Jon had been my good friend when he worked at Radio Shack, so we were excited to have him come on board. Actually, he was the second president of Microsoft. We hired another gentlemen [chuckles] who was with us for a little less than a year where it wasn't a good match. A gentlemen from Tektronix. And then brought in Jon after that.
There was a week in 1986 that was pretty exciting because that was the week we moved into the campus. Here is Jon with his "Move" T-shirt and I guess this is me in my new office with my "Move" T-shirt. But that same week we moved in, we went public as a company, this is our offering prospectus. And that was also the week of Microsoft's first CD-ROM Conference where we were pushing the idea of multimedia back in 1986 that didn't really catch on, you could say, until 1994 so before it was in the mainstream. But this kind of shows you the pace of activity at that time. We felt fine to have all those things happen all at once. And I know that next Monday I flew down to Australia to be part of a big software show down there.
DA: Let's talk a little about going public and whether that was something that everybody accepted that you needed to do, whether it was a controversial issue, and what difference it made.
BG: Well, Microsoft had started giving out stock options to people as early as 1981. So we were sharing in the success we thought we'd have. As we did that, they had about a five year vesting period. And so as some people were starting to vest on quite a bit of their stock, there was the question of how would they get liquidity. Now you could just let it be traded privately, but then the price would fluctuate a lot because the supply would be so short. And I was quite reluctant to go public because of the overhead.
We had been able to track our stock price internally up in a very linear way. And with the market sort of maybe over-anticipating the future, or getting paranoid -- you know the stock would be very volatile. But I was convinced that it made sense. And as long as we were going to do it, it was an opportunity to really expose the company broadly. Talk about our vision where we had done well, where we were taking the industry. And it did become something that was covered very, very broadly by a lot of people. And it was extremely successful. The stock took off after this offering at $21.00 and it just zoomed up from there for many, many years.
DA: There was no regret about going public?
BG: Going public is not without its complexities in terms of dealing with analysts and all the reports. It is a little convoluted about when can you keep things secret versus having to go out and talk about those things. So, it is not totally simple. But the benefit of having the stock be very liquid for everyone was very positive. We didn't use any of the money that we raised. We just put that money in the bank and it sat there with all of the money that we had earned, because we were very profitable and had plenty of cash by this time. So our reason for going public was very different than any other company that was going public.
DA: You have a couple of charts there, Bill, that kind of track your growth that you might want to pick up. I'm curious to know whether it was more satisfying for you to add your first 100, 1,000, or 10,000 employees?? And, how did you feel about the incredible growth in your company in this time period?
BG: Well, the growth in sales was pretty rapid. We were doubling every two years. It just looks like an exponential curve. It is unusual because in here there is a lot of products that are coming and going, and products that are doing incredibly well and yet it looks very well ordered. The profits went up the same way. Actually, the profitability percentage rose a little bit as we moved up here. So it was very tightly managed.
The thing that really changes the company isn't the sales growth, though, it is the number of people. This shows you the total here.
We are now well over 15,000 employees. And yet, until we moved to Seattle we were about sixteen employees. Then we got up to a little over 30 when Steve came. Then right after Steve Ballmer comes then you see these periods of 40 to 129, 220 - 476 increasing at a very rapid rate.
It is swell because you can have all these other product groups. You can sell around the world and you can do better product support. You can lavish on the developers a great library. You can start a research group that is looking way out into the future. And your recruiting department can be the best at going out to all of those universities.
So many excellent things that the energetic, smart people we hired empowered us to do. But it does mean that I got to the point where I couldn't look at all of the code, which I had done in the early years.
At 100 people, I knew everybody. I even knew their license plates when they came and went. I knew really what everyone was up to. By the time it got to 1,000 that was no longer the case. I was hiring the managers and knew all of the managers, but there was a level of indirection. And, certainly, as you go up over 10,000 then there are several levels indirect. There are some managers you don't know. There are some products that you certainly know how they fit in if you are setting the overall strategy.
Now electronic mail has been a huge phenomena for us. And it keeps a little bit of a closer feel even if somebody's office is in another building, you're always sending them messages. Or, even if they're off in another country it makes that easy. So, we are not as big as our size suggests. But, it certainly has a bit of a different feel than the small company.
DA: At the same time, has your culture changed? Or has it been pretty stable?
BG: Well, the culture, of course, varies by group. The sales force has great sales people and have the same enthusiasm for software, but their day-to-day activity and measurement is quite different. In the product groups it is pretty similar today. The developers like writing great code. They like collaborating with the team, they like getting things out every eighteen months. They like watching the competition. If somebody is very smart and contributing a lot, then it is fun. If they don't match that kind of level of energy, then it is really not the right place for them.
It is an exciting thing. It is still a little bit different.
People can't come and talk to me everyday [laughs]. And so they have to look to their Business Unit Manager, which is how we have it setup. Certainly, we are trying to preserve all of that culture, and get the advantages of being a large company with a broad product line, with stability, worldwide presence, great support, and yet have the advantages that a small software company has.
DA: Bill, with the AT came a new chip that brought a lot of traditional speed and capability. How did that affect your business at Microsoft?
BG: After the PC came out in 1981, the next step that IBM took was the XT where they put a hard disk in. So, we did a version of MS-DOS with a hierarchical tree oriented file system.
The next step after that was the AT 286-based machine. The 286 was quite a bit faster than the 8088 that had come before. Almost four times as fast as the original 8088 machine. The problem was that if you wanted the 286 to address more memory, it had to run in a mode that was completely incompatible with the original chip. And none of the software would automatically move over to that. And this was because the 286 chip was designed before the PC got popular.
So, you could either use the chip and emulate the old machine, and just have the speed. Or, you could run it in the incompatible mode and get extra memory. Now, there are a lot of crazy ideas about how to get around this limitation. IBM and Intel fooled around with one that was kind of an emulation trick that involved using the debug features of the chip. It didn't work for them, so they got me to help out. I then basically proved that would never work.
Then Gordon Letwin, who worked for us, came up with another approach where you basically reset the chip all the time and restart it in order to mix the two modes. So, it was kind of problematic.
Clearly we were running out of the 640K of memory. And like whenever any address base gets pushed to its limit, you start doing what is called "bank switching" where instead of the address telling you what to choose, there is a state of the machine where it is choosing different physical memory into the logical address base. And so the 286 looked like an opportunity.
We did a version of our form of UNIX called XENIX for the machine. Other people did high-end operating systems. But it just wasn't powerful enough for that. So, the AT ended up being a high-speed DOS machine. And a little bit of a distraction for the industry to figure out what to do with it. We did run Windows on it, but in the final analysis, 286 machines were never really fast enough for Windows. I mean they were nice machines but, during the time of the 286 machine, Windows really did not catch on.
Also, the AT started to show a little bit that IBM's PC group, because it had merged with other groups and gotten very large, wasn't executing perfectly. There were reliability problems. The fact that other people came out with 286 machines so rapidly, they were starting to feel some pressure. When this machine came out they still had 65% market share and that would slide very rapidly over the next five years down to a less than fifteen percent market share for them.
DA: But, with the 286 you continued your expansion of many new products. Was this a continuation of your strategy? Or, was this a new direction as these products came to the market?
BG: Well, Microsoft always wanted to keep adding business units and do new products. We had started with the system software and languages and we kept going on with that, but we really added a lot in the way of applications.
PowerPoint -- we went and bought a company that had pioneered the idea of a presentation piece of software. That was very successful. We got into the mail business. The red box is our Macintosh boxes. We kept enhancing Word and now Excel. Word on the Macintosh was graphical. And then we put Word on Windows. We kept doing new versions of the mouse. You are seeing here that the mouse is getting a sleeker design than the original mouse had. We started to ship Microsoft Windows. A version that was specific to the 286 and later a version for the 386.
Now, one of the big controversies of this era was some of the work that we were doing with IBM.
We knew that DOS was being stretched. We needed to get to more addressing capability with DOS. And a lot of other features; multitasking, protection, things that DOS didn't have. And so we had started our own project, early on, called DOS 4. And then IBM came along and wanted to play a stronger role than just licensing. That was something we were a little worried about, because of multi-site development and the way their developers were trained was very different from the way we worked. But we came up with a way of trying to work together.
The project although during this time was called CP DOS or Big DOS, when it was finally announced, which was part of the next generation after the AT that IBM did, which they called the PS/2 launch in April 1987 [laughs]. That was when they announced this operating system OS/2. It actually shipped somewhat [laughs] later than that. So, during a lot of these years we were not only working on Windows, we were also working on OS/2. Depending on how good of a job IBM does in helping promote OS/2, even though it was a lot bigger, we were thinking that might come on.
We were the company who really got behind OS/2. We did Excel and Word. We were the first people to do applications for it as it got out there. Also, a graphical application called Presentation Manager came out in 1988 and 1989. So, there was just a lot of new software development going on at Microsoft. Also, a lot more localization doing versions for all the different countries of the world. And taking advantage of the fact that the PC market was not only growing in the U.S., but because the other countries were catching up, it was growing very, very rapidly, particularly in Europe. We were establishing subsidiaries throughout Europe and actually got our European sales up where they were larger than our U.S. sales during this time.
Challenges of the Windows Interface
DA: Bill, we are looking at an early version of Windows. What were some of the major challenges in bringing this technology to the PC?
BG: There are many things that the PC needed in order to be able to run the graphical interface; more memory, more hard disk, more processor speed, and more screen resolution.
We started Windows when the screen resolution was 640 by 200. And, the next step up was a board -- I did a lot of design on -- that IBM came out with called the EGA, 640 by 350, that for the first time gave you good character display and graphics. And that was popular for awhile. But it wasn't until another level, 640 by 486, called VGA came out. Likewise in hard disk. When Windows started shipping in 1987, we had like ten and 20 megabyte hard disk. Well, it wasn't until they were 80 megabytes until it caught on. We started with the 286. But it took the 386.
Now at the same time as the hardware is getting better we are also improving Windows and convincing people to write Windows applications. And so the gestation period was pretty long. But certainly between late 1983 when we announced it and 1990, the primary focus of the company, and the speeches I gave, the promotion I did, was to get people to believe in graphics interface whether it was Macintosh or Windows. And that was a tough thing because people like WordPerfect and Lotus refused to put the resources into doing applications. Just like Dave refused to get involved with Apple's Macintosh. So, it was a serious problem and we just kept having to push and push.
One of the developments that was a major thing is this move to the 386. Unlike the 286, the 386 was designed after the PC had gotten popular. So Intel knew they were designing a chip that was to work with PC software. So, they did a nice job of handling the ability to run the original PC applications, and at the same time, supporting applications that could use lots of memory, the so called, "linear 32-bit address base." In a sense they were just seeing that the Motorola chip was winning a lot of the high-end designs, and taking that linear addressing feature which products like the VAX had had for quite some time, and putting it into their chip architecture in a nice upwards-compatible way.
Now, Intel had promised the 286 and had been very late in getting it done. It had a lot of bugs. Not much availability. A lot of people were wary when the 386 was supposed to come out, and about what they should do about it. Particularly since not much software exploitation done on the 286. And unless you are technical you would think, "Well, if they haven't done the 286, who cares about this 386." Well, to us the 386 was fantastic. And we wanted people to move to it very rapidly so that we could write more powerful software.
We had a great relationship with Compaq. And we said to them, well in the same way they had done portables early on, they ought to establish a reputation for high-performance and be the first to bring out a 386 machine. And that was gutsy because they were kind of under IBM's shadow. And maybe IBM when they did a 386 would do it in a different way. But, we convinced them to do it and they did excellent work. In 1986 they were first to come out with a 386 machine. In fact, that led to a very, very successful period for Compaq, not just in portables, but now in the desktop as well. And that was good news for us because it meant that there was an opportunity for Windows to get in there.
We started thinking that OS/2 might really do well because of the 386 had extra speed. In fact, one of the great disagreements between ourselves and IBM was we kept saying, "Let's skip the 286 and do the 386 version and not worry about the 286 version." But they felt like they wanted to put it onto the 286, even though those machines never had enough disk or enough memory. I mean it was certainly in retrospect and definitely our position at the time, that that was a total waste. And that was one of the things that generated some tension between us, as well as the fact, that we were using very small software development teams and at one point they had about 1,400 people working on OS/2 just turning out code that wasn't well integrated.
Battle Between OS/2 and Windows
DA: One of the famous battles in the history of personal computers, at this time, was the battle which in some ways is still going on between OS/2 and Windows. What is your perspective on that?
BG: Well, in this period you'd have to call it the "Battle of the Weaklings", because until 1990 neither product sold at all. And in 1990, Windows took off. DOS was dominant. It was a successful product for us. So we could reinvest in doing great new things. Some people like Windows. Maybe ten percent to fifteen percent of users were using it. And they consider themselves sort of an elite group. We, of course, had Excel on Windows. And so people who wanted the greatest spreadsheet would move up to Windows. People who did desktop publishing, PageMaker, and many others wanted to use Windows. But it wasn't a broad scale thing. And even people who used it, would use it for awhile and then they'd exit back to DOS to use other applications. That is despite the fact that we put so much effort to make it compatible and to allow you to run DOS applications underneath it, particularly on the 386. But that didn't catch on.
OS/2, on the other hand, was just too big. I mean we had thought that IBM with their corporate presence could really jam it on people and get people to use it. And that proved to be an illusion. This whole overall strategy that OS/2 is part of called "SAA" or "Systems Applications Architecture", where supposedly everything on the mainframe, all of that complexity, you just made it identical on the PC. Same graphics model, the Presentation Manager. It just didn't catch on the way that IBM had anticipated. OS/2 was a schizophrenic product.
We kept saying, "Let's add features. But no let's make it smaller. Let's do the 386 version." But no, IBM made some commitment to some 286 customer. A very painful effort. And a very compromised piece of technology as a result. We then started up a parallel effort to do, what at the time was called OS/2 3.0, starting from scratch, even though we'd give it that same name. And that later became, as IBM and Microsoft went their own way, that became the project that shipped in 1993 as Microsoft Windows NT. But the work was begun on that as early as 1987. Then Cutler came in and the work really started in a big way in 1989.
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David K. Allison, Chairman, Division of Information Technology and Society. National
Museum of American History.
Research specialties: Computer technologies; military technology; social history
of technology.
B.A. (1973) St. John's College; Ph.D. (1980) Princeton University.
09/27/1994 Final Edit Kris Kaeding
06/28/1995 Webification by David Allison and Mikel Maron
Copyright 1994